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Abstract
This paper analyzes the properties of the advanced Opaque booking systems
used by the online travel agencies in conjunction with their traditional transparent
booking system. In section 2 we present an updated literature review. This review
underlines the interest and the specificities of Opaque goods in the Tourism Indus-
try. It also characterizes properties of the Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) channel
introduced by Priceline and offering probabilistic goods to potential travelers. In
the section 3 of the paper we present a theoretical model, in which we wonder
what kind of Opaque system can be implemented by a given online monopoly. We
compare the Opaque “Hotwire system”, a NYOP system without any possibility
of rebidding and the joint implementation of these two systems. We find that
the NYOP system and the joint implementation can have challenging properties
if consumer’s information is complete. Then, in section 4, we analyze the case of
incomplete information. We develop an appropriate setting to integrate the lack
of complete information of potential passengers on their relative propensity to pay.
We analyze three cases corresponding to different levels of uncertainty and number
of tickets available. We find that in some relevant cases (average number of tick-
ets, moderate uncertainty), the joint implementation of 2 different Opaque booking
systems is advantageous for the Online travel Agencies (OTAs)and airlines. This
result casts doubt on the current OTAs’ strategies.
JEL Classification: D49, L93
Keywords: Opaque Selling, Name-Your-Own-Price, Economics of Tourism, Online
Travel Agencies, Probabilistic Goods.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the advanced Opaque booking systems used by online travel
agencies in conjunction with their traditional transparent booking system. This type of
pricing system has been introduced since many years by online travel agencies in the
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USA. They offer the consumers a price advantage, as a counterpart of opacity and uncer-
tainty. Conversely, they provide the companies and intermediaries a good way to manage
dynamically the fluctuations of demand function when supply is rigid in the short term.
These new systems have already interested few specialists. On the one hand some papers
focus on pricing system’s nature and their properties, and on the other hand - other ones
interested in the reactions of demand to this pricing innovation. What are the advan-
tages of using such pricing system for suppliers (carriers, airlines and tourism services
providers), intermediaries (GDS, travel agencies) and consumers? What sort of competi-
tion or segmentation do they involve on the tourism services markets? Does the nature
of tourism products change because of these new pricing systems reducing the available
information? These points have been raised for each variant of these new Opaque sys-
tem. We present briefly the results of these works and the methodology that they have
adopted. Then, we consider an important issue still not elucidated: since many variants
of Opaque systems exist, is there an advantage to use simultaneously more than one
distribution channel?
The literature review is presented in section 2. It underlines Opaque product specifici-
ties and advantages for Tourism Industry. It also characterizes properties of the NYOP
channel introduced by Priceline and offering probabilistic goods to potential travelers.
In section 3, we present a theoretical model, in which we wonder what kind of Opaque
system can be implemented by a given online monopoly. We compare an Opaque posted-
price “Hotwire system”, a NYOP system without any possibility of rebidding and the
joint implementation of these two systems. We find that when information is imperfect
(the travelers do not know the nature and the number of tickets available) but complete
(the Opaque system’s potential clients know their number and their respective propensity
to pay), it is equivalent to implement the most efficient system (the NYOP system) or
both of the systems in parallel. We introduce in section 4 an assumption of incomplete
information (the travelers know their number but not their relative propensity to pay).
In this case, we find that, under moderate uncertainty, the joint implementation of two
booking systems dominates the implementation of the NYOP channel only.
2 NYOP and Opaque products: a literature review
In the last years, the emergence of the Internet has deeply changed the industry of
tourism, the organization of markets and the pricing mechanisms developed by firms.
Tourism is by far the most developed and innovative online business, fostered by the
creation of online travel agencies (OTAs) of different kinds and sophisticated pricing and
segmentation strategies. Dominant global OTAs have emerged, Expedia, Travelocity,
Orbitz, Opodo, which dominate the distribution of travel and tourism services, but the
extensive uses of the Internet have given rise to niche players. Most of these players
have specialized in specific segment of the market, in terms of destination or services,
but some others have been more inventive, experimenting innovative pricing models.
Hotwire.com (acquired by Expedia in 2003) and Priceline.com are the two most important
companies having successfully developed this strategy on the US market, to account for
6.7% of worldwide online hotel bookings in 2006 for instance. They have developed
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online pricing mechanisms such asName-Your-Own-Price in which instead of posting a
price, the seller waits for an offer of the potential buyer that he can then either accept
or reject, or such as Opaque offers, in which the characteristics of the services are hidden
(hotel or airlines brands, travel schedule). These empirical developments open many
different questions. Why would hotels and airline companies be willing to sell their
products through Priceline/Hotwire and lose the advantage (and pro?t) that product
differentiation gives them (Shapiro and Shi, 2008)? Why firms would deviate from the
standard practices of posting a take-it-or-leave-it offer? Certainly firms should find these
strategies more profitable. But as pointed out by Pinker et al. (2003), and underlined
in Wilson and Zhang (2008), ‘though on-line auctions are a multi-billion dollar annual
activity, with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms, scientific research
on them is at an early stage’. Nevertheless, some interesting advances can be traced
in the recent literature, related to the innovative strategies implemented by Priceline or
Hotwire. This short review focuses on the two main types of related literature which have
been developed. The first one analyses Name-Your-Own-Price selling mechanism, while
the second focuses on the Opaque selling with posted prices.
2.1 Name-Your-Own-Price selling mechanism
Wilson and Zhang (2008) present a model of a NYOP intermediary, who sells economy car
rentals on a specific date. The retailer capacity is in excess. He provides consumers with
a function that describes the chance of a bid to get accepted. Intermediary clients are
limited to a single bid. The retailer objective is to force the consumers to bid maximum
that will maximize his profits, while consumers intend to maximize their own surpluses.
Consequently, the intermediary will choose an appropriate function of bid’s probability
of success so as his clients will bid maximum. Since he provides this function, which is
the same for all consumers, each of them is treated fairly, even if the prices they pay are
different. Using different method (experimental economics), Shapiro and Zillante (2007)
analyze seller profits maximization. They emphasize that their importance is a result of
a trade-off between the number of bids accepted and their amounts, which depends on
the threshold price and on the presence of opacity. They outline that concealing some
of good information is detrimental for consumers and does not change anything for the
seller, unless the threshold price is too low. In such case his profits will decrease. On
the opposite, Wang, Gal-Or and Chatterjee (2005) show that a moderate opacity level
can be profitable for the retailer. Indeed, it helps to segment the demand and though
to price discriminate the consumers. It will attract some supplementary clients with-
out creating cannibalisation effects of the posted-price channel. The paper considers a
monopoly service provider distributing a fixed capacity through its own web site using
posted-price mechanism and through a NYOP intermediary during a two stage game.
He faces an uncertain and heterogeneous demand. He perceives a signal of the state of
the demand after the first stage of the game. On one hand, if the signal is perfectly or
highly informative, the uncertainty almost disappears. Then, the market segmentation is
only feasible and profitable with sufficiently low or high capacity. On the other hand, if
the signal provides no information about the demand and if capacity is high, the service
provider will use only the posted-price channel; otherwise, he will use only the NYOP
channel. The optimal precision of demand signal is an intermediate value, what means
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that some uncertainty remains.
Hann and Terwiesch (2003) identify a double source of profits for the NYOP retailer:
intermediary margin, which is defined as a difference between the price paid for the prod-
uct to a service provider and the threshold price, and the informational margin, which
corresponds to the difference between the price paid by a consumer and the threshold
price. The customers are heterogeneous in their experience and though in the level of
frictional and transaction costs that they afford. This heterogeneity leads to a market
segmentation that allows the retailer to price discriminate his clients and improve its
profits. Fay (2008) also demonstrates that frictional costs have an influence on market
segmentation and on seller profits. Because of market segmentation, price competition on
the market is reduced. The duopoly model developed in the paper 1 emphasizes that im-
plementation of a NYOP channel will reduce the competition and improve overall profits
in comparison to the situation when both retailers choose posted-price market format.
The model stresses that if one of competitors chooses NYOP format, while his rival selects
posted-price market, he should restrict its customers to only one bid. Because repeated
bidding increases consumer’s interest for NYOP selling, it causes a loss of posted-price
seller profits, who, in order to attract some consumers, decreases his price, what derives
the bid’s amounts down. In contrast, Spann, Skiera and Scha¨fers (2004) show that al-
lowing consumers to repeat their bids may improve seller profits, because the possibility
of rebidding leads to higher amounts of maximum bids.
Another type of consumer’s heterogeneity is presented by Fay (2004). Some con-
sumers, called ”sophisticated” manage to bypass the restriction of a single bid and the
others - do not. This creates a new segmentation of demands. The paper compares three
situations: single bid, repeat bidding and partial-repeat bidding. The model demon-
strates that intermediary profits are exactly the same if the restriction of single bid is
kept up or if it is not imposed. On the opposite, partial-repeat bidding deteriorates
retailer profits, but this relation is not monotonic. On one hand, if the number of sophis-
ticated consumers is very low, firm’s profits will reduce as their number increases. On
the other hand, if their percentage is very important, profits will increase with their num-
ber. Therefore, this paper gives the guidelines how to well implement a NYOP strategy
in order to better segment the demand and thus reduce price competition. Terwiesch,
Savin and Hann (2005) present demand segmentation based on differences in haggling
costs occurred by consumers. Retailer can price discriminate his clients, because of this
differential. They provide a model of an online haggling process at a NYOP seller web
site with no opacity, constant threshold price and possibility of rebidding. Retailer can
manipulate consumer’s haggling cost by complicating his website interface or by mod-
ifying the time delay with which the customer is notified that his bid was rejected, in
order to diminish cannibalisation effect of haggling. Thus, seller profits increase when
consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous and if there is a positive correlation between
their valuations and haggling costs.
Fay and Laran (2008) add an original idea to the literature on NYOP mechanism.
1It is the only existing paper considering the case of competition and NYOP selling.
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They analyze the situation, where the threshold price varies under repeat bidding. Ev-
ery consumer’s bid rejection provides him with new information. If he expects that the
threshold price is constant, his bidding pattern is monotonically increasing. However, if
he suppose that the threshold price will vary, his bidding behavior will depend on the
degree of expected variability and on his patience. The paper’s main implication is that
changing threshold price may attract and retain more customers.
Spann, Banhardt, Ha¨ubl and Skiera (2005) compare the NYOP format with Select-
Your-Price (SYP) mechanism, where consumers are influenced by the range of possible
candidate bids. Providing a list of possible bids may be perceived as a format giving more
information about the seller threshold price and thus decreases customer’s uncertainty
about product’s value. The median and mean bids are the lowest in the NYOP format,
so it is dominated by the SYP one. As the threshold price increases, seller profits raise
monotonically. They are at their maximum, when the threshold price is equal to variable
cost. However, when the candidate bids are high, the profits depend on the tradeoff
between the increase in bid’s amounts and the reduction in the number of placed bids.
2.2 Opaque Products
The second type of literature analyses another type of Opaque selling, where prices are
posted. These papers focus on the fact that some of the product’s attributes or char-
acteristics are concealed from the consumers. In the traditional channels it was already
not always beneficial to fully inform consumers about market prices, because of the risk
of increase of their price sensitivity and then - of creation of downward price pressures.
In that case it is beneficial for service providers to implement multichannel distribution
across the mechanisms with different levels of market transparency. Grandos, Gupta and
Kauffman (2008) present a model of a supplier, who distributes his product over two
online channels, differentiated by the levels of market transparency, characterized by the
same marginal distribution costs. They provide mechanisms for a supplier to set opti-
mally the prices and to influence transparency in order to successfully price discriminate
his clients. First, they estimate a demand function of the product, then identify the
differences in the demand functions across the two online selling mechanisms and finally,
set the optimal prices based on those differences. Empirical analysis presented in the
paper confirms the model’s results and provides an additional outcome, which states that
a supplier in order to increase its revenues can increase the price differential across the
selling mechanisms.
Y. Jiang (2007) models a monopoly who distributes tourism devices (airline tick-
ets, hotel rooms) on two types of markets: full-informational and Opaque, and wonders
are the consequences of the use of the Opaque channel on firm’s profits and the global
welfare. He defines also the conditions of successful implementation of price discrimina-
tion. The firm’s profits as well as the overall welfare are greater while serving only the
full-informational market. Things get more complicated when the firm decides to serve
both of the markets. The firm’s strategy will depend on the degree of homogeneity of
demand. If the demand is too homogeneous or too heterogeneous, the monopoly will
choose to serve only the full-informational market, because of the risk of cannibalisation
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effect. When the demand is heterogeneous enough, the two types of market will co-exist.
The dual-market strategy will improve firm’s profits, by reducing the unsold inventory
and social welfare, by serving some extremely price sensitive consumers, who would not
travel otherwise. This result is confirmed by Shi and Shapiro (2008), who wonder why
the service providers decide to sell their products through Opaque sites and though lose
the advantages given by product differentiation; for the consumers Opaque products are
indistinguishable and become perfect substitutes. First of all, selling through the Opaque
channel helps the service providers to respond to changes in demand without the need
to change current branding and pricing policies. In the model the Opaque travel agency
act as a ”collusion device” which facilitates price discrimination between different types
of consumers and increases overall profits, even if the total market demand is perfectly
inelastic. The model is a variation of Hotelling’s (1929) and Salop’s (1979) models. The
paper’s main result is that for a certain range of parameters values distribution through
an Opaque agency enables hotels to discriminate their customers. Without the Opaque
agency the hotels would compete for both high and low type consumers on the non-
Opaque channel. The presence of low-type consumers intensifies the competition and
drives down the equilibrium price and profits. When the Opaque channel is introduced
a new equilibrium arises, derived from the Bertrand competition model. In the new
equilibrium, hotel’s competition for the low-type consumers increases, but decreases for
the high-type ones. It still remains a Hotelling competition, but the hotels do no longer
compete for the low-type segment. If there are enough high-type consumers, the overall
profits will increase. The intensified competition for the low-type consumers enables ho-
tels to decrease the competition for the high type ones. Another paper, analyzing the case
of competition, is the Fay’s (2007) one. He models a duopoly competition with multiple
service providers who use a common intermediary. The paper introduces brand loyalty
2. If there is little brand loyalty in the market, the introduction of Opaque sales will
raise price competition and lower industry profits. If there is sufficient brand loyalty, the
Opaque sales will reduce price competition and raise the industry profits. The degree of
price competition will depend on the number of units allocated to the Opaque channel.
Service providers have an incentive to contract with the Opaque intermediary, if there is
enough brand-loyalty in the industry. One of the model’s hypotheses is that the firms
have no constraints, so the Opaque channel will lead to market expansion.
Opaque products can be seen as probabilistic goods, as emphasized by Fay and Xie
(2007). They define a probabilistic good as a gamble involving a probability of getting
any one of a set of multiple distinct items. Accordingly, we speak about probabilistic
selling, when a seller creates a probabilistic good using existing distinct products or
services (called component goods), which he offers as additional purchase possibility.
Consequently, implementation of probabilistic selling helps the retailer to segment the
market by creating a new different type of consumer’s uncertainty. Thus, the retailer
implements price discrimination that can considerably increase his profits if marginal costs
are sufficiently low. When there is an advantage from introducing a probabilistic good, it
is generally optimal to assign an equal probability to each component products, even if the
demand is asymmetric. On the opposite cannibalisation effects may appear. Moreover,
2Idea developed also in Fay(2008) concerning the NYOP channel.
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probabilistic selling is most advantageous when the component goods have moderate
differences. An important advantage of probabilistic selling concerns seller own demand
uncertainty. It provides a buffer against its negative effects and its profit advantages
are even greater with demand uncertainty. Indeed, introduction of a probabilistic good
reduces or even eliminates the dependence of pricing decisions on the identity of the more
popular product. The most optimal results were obtained with sufficiently high demand
uncertainty and mid-range capacity level.
3 The diversification of Opaque Channels with com-
plete information
In this paper we tend to answer one main question: is it suitable and efficient for a given
online agency to use simultaneously more than one alternative Opaque channels?
The answer is complex and depends on many circumstances, and mainly on the com-
petitive environment. If we consider a competitive game, in which every competitor
chooses one single channel, the equilibrium could be an asymmetric equilibrium where
each intermediary specializes and distributes on a specific channel. If Agencies A, B and
C compete at the alternative channels: posted - price Opaque Channel, Last Minute
channel and NYOP channel, each one should specialize in a different type of selling. If
there is only one Agency in a situation of monopoly and that the point is to find the
best allocation of potential travelers on alternative channels, the best solution would be,
theoretically, the first degree price discrimination. As in many other cases, this strategy is
probably not fully implementable due to its complexity. The NYOP Opaque solution (the
“Priceline system”) seems however to be the closest one. Supposing that the population
of travelers is risk neutral, fully informed about the characteristics of remaining tickets on
alternative channels (company, hour of departure. . . ) and knows also perfectly the distri-
bution of the propensities to pay of the others potential travelers, each consumer will be
able to bid (or not) a price corresponding to his reservation price, given the uncertainty
on the number of seats and on their attributes. However, this result validity depends on
the level of incompleteness of potential traveler informations. Suppose for instance that
potential travelers with high propensity to pay are also less informed on ticket’s distribu-
tion and on the propensity to pay of other agents: they will probably over-estimate the
utility they can derive from the NYOP channel and bid lower price than they would, if
the information was complete. In this case, implementation of a “Last minute” channel
would be a better strategy. However, this solution has an inconvenient: it does not re-
sist to time depreciation. If travelers want to book hotel rooms, to rent a car. . . , more
generally if the airline ticket is an element among others of a packaged product providing
them an overall utility, the ”Last minute” solution will sharply decrease their utility. In
this paper we consider ”Last minute” selling as a complementary channel to the Opaque
one.
It is quite complicated to decide if two or more forms of Opaque channels can coexist.
Consider for instance the NYOP Priceline channel and the Opaque Hotwire one. Both of
these channels are Opaque, i.e. do not provide precisely the travelers with the certainty
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on the quality of the travel. Once more, if all passengers had complete information on
the flight’s frequency and the other ticket’s attributes and if they knew precisely the
distribution of the other’s consumer’s propensities to pay, all of them would be able to
choose to use the NYOP system only, and leave the Opaque channel, which could be
redundant. In the following subsection we will try to confirm this intuition.
3.1 The model
We suppose that everyday there are 2 flights from city 1 to city 2: the first leaves city 1 at
7:00 am and the other at 6:00 pm. These flights booking level on the traditional channel
is ordinarily estimated with a small error only few days before the date of departure.
This short slot makes the ”Last Minute” solution inappropriate for “impatient” low price
travelers. Indeed, it actually concerns a distinct “patient” sub-population of travelers,
which we are not going to consider in this paper. Subsequently the agency decides to
implement an adapted Opaque channel and to offer to the “impatient” low rate travelers
an adapted booking system. The agency knows the distribution of the states of the world,
which are defined by table 1.
States of the world Number and type of Probability
available seats
1 m at 7:00 am 1/4
2 m at 6:00 pm 1/4
3 2m at 7:00 am 1/8
4 m at 7:00 am 1/4
m at 6:00 pm
5 2m at 6:00 pm 1/8
Table 1: Available seats for the flights from city 1 to city 2 on a given date
The agency can implement either:
(i) an Opaque “Hotwire style” posted-price system;
(ii) a NYOP “Priceline style” system;
(iii) both of the systems.
The sequence of the actions is as follows:
- At stage 1, the online travel agency (OTA) chooses between (i), (ii) and (iii). If (i) or
(iii) has been selected, the agency fixes the price of the Opaque channel. If (ii) or (iii)
have been chosen, the travel agency launches a single bid process for the tickets.
- At stage 2, if the OTA has initially chosen (i), the potential travelers decide to buy
or not a ticket on the Opaque channel. If the OTA has chosen (ii), they choose to post
or not a single bid. If the OTA has chosen (iii), they chose to buy a ticket on the Opaque
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channel, or to post a bid on the NYOP channel or to reserve.
- At stage 3, the OTA knows the number and the nature of the available seats on each
flight. If (i) or (iii) have been chosen at stage 1, the OTA distributes the tickets to the
buyers on the Opaque channel. If (ii) or (iii) have been chosen, the agency decides the
threshold price for the NYOP channel and sells the tickets to those whose bids exceed
this price. Each successful bider pays the posted rate.
The relevant equilibrium concept is a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the travel agency
is leader. The game is solved by backward induction. At stage 3, the travel agency chooses
the best action (i.e. fixes the lower limit price of the NYOP channel if the devices (ii) and
(iii) have been selected), given the action previously taken by the travelers at stage 2. At
stage 2 the potential travelers choose their own best actions, given the travel agency’s
decisions at time 1 (the implemented system and the Opaque channel price if the (i) or
(iii) schemes have been implemented), their expectations of the travel agency’s decisions
at stage 3 and the level of information on the chance that their bids get accepted, if the
information on the characteristics of the auction process, when the devices (ii) or (iii) are
implemented, is imperfect. At stage 1, the travel agency chooses the appropriate device
and the rates of the Opaque channel if the devices (i) or (iii) are implemented.
We suppose that information is imperfect but complete (travelers know the states of
the world and their respective probability).
3.2 The optimal choices of the agency
Let’s consider successively the three kinds of solutions for the travel agency.
(i) If the Opaque channel is implemented alone, the agency fixes at stage 1 the price pO
such that pO maximizes the joint profit of the airline and the travel agency pi(pO) = mpO.
The quantity of available seats for the Opaque channel is m, because it is the higher level
of seats available at stage 3 in all states of the world. The level of pO is then such that
the agency extracts the whole surplus of the last traveler choosing the Opaque channel.
Whatever the rate of the Opaque channel fixed at stage 1 would be, the potential travelers
whose net utility is greater or equal to zero at this rate will choose to buy a ticket on this
channel. The best solution for the travel agency is then to charge a rate that exhausts the
last potential Opaque channel traveler’s surplus. These travelers will be located on their
respective segment on points a1i such that (a−a1i )/a = m/2n, i.e. at a1i = a(2n−m)/2n.
The resulting value of pO which vanishes the net utility of the agents located on a1i is then
such that a1i (u+ u¯/2)−pO = 0 since the states of the world and the distribution of agents
on the segments [0, a] is common knowledge. Then we obtain pO = a(2n−m)(u+u¯/2)/2n
and
piO = mpO = (2nm−m2)a(u+ u¯/2)/2n (1)
(ii) If the NYOP channel is the only to be implemented, at stage 3 and in each state
of the world, the travel agency will choose the higher threshold value such that all the
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potential travelers whose bids are greater or equal that the threshold will exhaust the
market. As the OTA determines this value after observing the state of the world, there
are two possibilities. If only m tickets are available, the price pNH will be high: it will
correspond to the reservation price of the last of the m high propensity to pay agents that
integrate in their expected utility the possibility to pay less if 2m seats are available. If
the number of available ticket is 2m, the price pNH will be lower as it corresponds to the
propensity to pay of the last of the 2m travelers who integrate in their expected utility
the uncertainty. At stage 2, the bidders will be able to integrate the optimal choices of the
agency in their own decision and, among other, to consider their bids getting accepted.
From usual deductions relative to the optimal bidders behavior, we deduce that, given
the resulting expected value of their choices, the bidders will not bid lower price than
their reservation price. If they are able to understand correctly the NYOP system, they
will calculate the price that they will actually pay as the reservation price of the last
successful bid in each state of the world. In fact, there exist two possible bidding prices:
bidding prices greater or equal than pNH that guarantee the travel and bidding prices
greater or equal to pNL but smaller than p
N
H that make the travel uncertain. Whatever
the level of their bids, if they are greater than pNH or between p
N
L and p
N
H , the passengers
will only pay pNL or p
N
H : their net expected utility is then defined by ai(u + u¯/2) − pNH
if they decide to bid at price pNL and [ai(u+ u¯/2) −pNL
]
/2 if they decide to bid at rate
pNL . From elementary calculus, we deduce the threshold values a
2∗
i and a
2∗∗
i separating
respectively on each segment [0, a] the potential travelers choosing to reserve and the
potential travelers choosing to bid pNL , and the potential travelers choosing to bid p
N
L
and pNH . These values are a
2∗
i = a(n−m)/n and a2∗∗i = a(2n−m)/2n. Then we deduce
the equilibrium prices pNL = a(n−m)(u+ u¯/2)/n and pNH = a(2n−m)(u+ u¯/2)/2n, the
joint profit of the airline and of the travel agency piN = mPNH +mP
N
L /2 or
piO/N = mpO +mpN/2 = (3nm− 2m2)a(u+ u¯/2)/2n (2)
(iii) If the two channels are jointly implemented, the OTA allocates the first set of m
seats to the Opaque channel, where it targets the high propensity to pay customers. The
second set of m seats is allocated to the NYOP channel - to the travelers with a lower
propensity to pay. At stage 1, the agency chooses the price for the Opaque channel and
offers to the travelers the possibility to bid in the NOYP channel. As in case (i), the price
of the Opaque channel is pO = a(2n−m)(u + u¯/2)/2n. The NYOP channel targets the
next m passengers and is activated at price pN = a(n−m)(u+ u¯/2)/n. The joint profit
of the airline and the travel agency is then piO/N = mpO +mpN/2 or:
piN = (2mpNH +mp
N
L )/2 = (3nm− 2m2)a(u+ u¯/2)/2n (3)
Subsequently we deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If potential low rate travelers are completely informed on the random
number and distribution of available seats and on the propensity to pay of every agent, it
is equivalent for the airline and the agency to implement a NYOP channel alone and to
realize the joint implementation of an Opaque and a NYOP channel.
Proof : Expressions (1), (2) and (3) represent the amounts of the joint profits of the
airline and the travel agency at Stackelberg equilibriums associated respectively to the
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implementation of an Opaque channel, a NYOP channel and jointly an Opaque channel
and a NYOP channel. The comparison of (1), (2) and (3) proves that, whatever the
values of the parameters u, u¯, a, n, and m are, piO/N = piN > piO 
In accordance with intuition, the Opaque “Hotwire style” channel is not an optimal
solution for potential travelers if it is implemented alone: the travelers with high propen-
sity to pay are indifferent between this selling mechanism and its joint implementation
with the NYOP channel, while the travelers with low propensity to pay prefer the two
other selling technologies. Another observation is that, if travelers are risk neutral (as
we have supposed them to be), it is equivalent for high propensity travelers to pay pO
for the Opaque channel or to use the NYOP channel which theoretically provides them
with a random price. Note however that when we introduce even a little risk aversion,
the agents with high propensity to pay will prefer to pay pO: this observation can provide
the background for the joint implementation of an Opaque and a NYOP channels which
then could be more efficient than the NYOP channel considered alone.
4 Joint Opaque Channels with incomplete informa-
tion
A first type of incompleteness is linked with the bad knowledge from travelers of the
stochastic distribution of the demand of tickets from the traditional channels. The sea-
sonal, daily and hourly evolution of traditional demand follows complex laws which are
not easily understood by travelers. The statistical distribution of demand variations dur-
ing the period could involve information incompleteness for travelers or informational
asymmetries between the OTA and the travelers on the one hand, and on the other
hand - between the travelers. It is however advantageous for the airlines to adapt partly
their supply to these variations. Consequently, it is advantageous for airlines and OTA
to diffuse appropriate statistics on seats distribution for each destination and for every
sub-period of time. Then we suppose that this cause of bad information is not the major
motive of uncertainty and concentrate on a second type of incompleteness. Indeed, bid-
ders lack relevant information on the other consumers propensities to pay. The number
of the potential travelers from which the sample of bidders for a given destination is
extracted makes for each bidder very difficult to perceive its relative propensity to pay or
the level of its own propensity to pay compared with the propensities to pay of the other
bidders. This lack of information has dramatical consequences: with information com-
pleteness, our example provides only two bidding prices when the NYOP is implemented
or when the Opaque system and the NYOP are jointly implemented: as we verified ana-
lytically, whatever the propensity to pay of the traveler is, it will never be interesting for
him to bid at a price different from pNL or p
N
H . Once travelers cannot calculate p
N
L or p
N
H
or calculate the same level from these threshold prices, it could be rational for each of
them to offer different prices when the selling system is the NYOP mechanism or another
booking system.
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4.1 The general setting
Lets consider the segment where are located all potential travelers preferring the 7:00
am (resp. the 6:00 pm) flight to the other one and assume that passengers do not know
precisely their position on this segment. This uncertainty implies that their estimations
of the other passengers distribution on the segment and especially the distance [ai, a]
between their own location and the location of the agent with the highest propensity to
pay are imprecise. Then, we suppose that the agent located on ai estimates a as a˜ :
a˜− ai = q(a− ai) + (1− q)ai, q ∈ [0, 1] (4)
When q = 0, there is full uncertainty on the position of a and the traveler locates
himself on the middle of the segment [0, a]. When q = 1, the information on his posi-
tion is perfect. When q is comprised strictly between 0 and 1, the uncertainty on the
agent’s location is more or less moderate. We suppose that the travel agency knows this
imprecision of the agents on their relative propensity to pay. Now, lets consider the three
available possibilities of implementation of alternative selling mechanisms.
(i) If the Opaque channel is implemented alone with price pO, the travelers have
all the information on prices while taking their decision at time 2. Their behavior is
then unchanged. They will buy a ticket if a1i (u + u¯/2) − pO ≥ 0 and do nothing if
a1i (u + u¯/2) − pO < 0. The result is the same as in case of complete information, i.e.,
pO = a(2n−m)(u+ u¯/2)/2n and
piO = mpO = (2nm−m2)a(u+ u¯/2)/2n (5)
(ii) If the NYOP channel is implemented alone, at time 2 the bidders estimate the
probability of success of their bid. Given (4), they still compare ai(u + u¯/2) − pNH
(their estimated net utility if they choose to bid at price pNH and expect being able
to travel in all states of the world) and [ai(u+ u¯/2) −pNL
]
/2 (their estimated net util-
ity if they choose to bid a price higher then pNL , but lower then p
N
H) and 0 (their
utility if they decide to reserve). In this case, they are compelled to use their indi-
vidual estimations of a2∗i and a
2∗∗
i to evaluate p
N
L and p
N
H . Given (4), they calculate
a2p∗i = (aq− 2aiq+ 2ai)(n−m)/n, a2p∗∗i = (aq− 2aiq+ 2ai)(2n−m)/2n and then deduce
pNLi = (aq−2aiq+2ai)(n−m)(u+ u¯/2)/n and pNHi = (aq−2aiq+2ai)(u+ u¯/2)(2n−m)/2n
as threshold prices (depending on their location ai when the total number of seats is re-
spectively m and 2m). The higher is the propensity to pay of the traveler located in ai,
the greater his expected prices for the NYOP channel at low and high rates are. The
potentials travelers located at ai on one of the segments [0, a] consider themselves as
marginal agents between the passengers choosing reservation and the agents bidding at
low rate if ai = a
2p∗
i = (aq−2aiq+2ai)(n−m)/n, i.e. ai = aq(n−m)/[2nq−2mq−n+2m].
Agents located on the same segment at ai = a
2p∗∗
i = (aq − 2aiq + 2ai)(2n −m)/2n, i.e.
ai = aq(2n−m)/(4nq−2mq−2n+ 2m) consider similarly themselves as the limit agents
between the low rate bidders and high price ones. Note that these thresholds depend on
q, i.e. on the level of passengers uncertainty on their relative position on [0, a]. Then at
stage 2, potential passengers bids depend first on their position on [0, a] and on the level
of uncertainty. At stage 3, three cases are possible according to parameters values and
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the level of uncertainty:
case 1: a2∗i < a
2p∗
i < a
2∗∗
i < a
2p∗∗
i
case 2: a2∗i < a
2∗∗
i < a
2p∗
i < a
2p∗∗
i
case 3: a2p∗i < a
2∗
i < a
2∗∗
i < a
2p∗∗
i
These cases present different properties and though need to be analyzed separately.
4.2 Average number of tickets, relatively strong uncertainty
Lets begin by considering the 2nd case, which is illustrated by Figure 1. In order to define
it, it is sufficient to compare a2∗∗i and a
2p∗
i . Despite the number of parameters and the
difficulty to determine exhaustively the ranges of variation of n, m and q corresponding
to this case, it appears that average number of tickets (m slightly smaller than n/2) and
a quite high level of uncertainty (q values smaller than 1/2) can generate such a ranking
between a2∗∗i and a
2p∗
i .
N
LP             
N
HP  
    / 2a  
                                  
2*
ia      
2**
ia  
2 *p
ia      
2 **p
ia                
0 
a
Figure 1: Case 2, 2m available tickets.
From a direct observation of figure (1), we deduce Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. In case of incomplete information, when the threshold reservation utili-
ties are a2∗i < a
2∗∗
i < a
2p∗
i < a
2p∗∗
i , the joint implementation of the two systems will never
strongly dominate the single implementation of one of the systems.
Proof : Suppose that the NYOP channel is dominated by the joint implementation of
the NYOP and the Opaque systems. In this case, since the agents located between a2∗i
and a2p∗i do not bid when the NYOP system is implemented alone or jointly, only the
agents located between a2∗∗i and a are interested in this joint implementation and will
all choose the Opaque channel: consequently, the Opaque system implemented alone is
equivalent to the joint implementation of the two systems. With the opposite assump-
tion, the NYOP system alone dominates the joint implementation of the two systems, if
we consider OTA’s profits. 
In case 2, the level of information incompleteness is such that the Opaque systems
are all inefficient to clear the market. In this case, the OTA and the airlines should
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develop a non Opaque last minute systems with traditional dynamic pricing, adapted to
the last minute demand. Another possibility for the airlines and the OTA is to develop
information systems in order to increase q and though make the Opaque channel more
efficient.
4.3 Average number of tickets, moderate uncertainty
In case 1 we suppose that the number of tickets available is smaller than half of the num-
ber of potential travelers (we must remain that a potential traveler is someone interested
in traveling at a positive rate: it is realistic to suppose that there are always potential
travelers, especially during holiday periods, that demand the tickets if the rate decreases
sufficiently). By moderate uncertainty we mean that a2∗∗i is less than a
2p∗∗
i .
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0 
a
Figure 2: Case 1, 2m available tickets.
In this case, when the NYOP system is applied, as illustrated in figure (2), the thresh-
old between the bid of those who expect to travel in all states of the world and those who
expect to travel only when there is a large number of available tickets is higher than in the
case of perfect information. The number of the travelers able to travel in all conditions
is consequently under-evaluated by themselves. Therefore, the travelers located between
a2p∗∗i and a pay higher (and different) rates than in the case of complete information to
travel in all states of the world, while the travelers located between a2∗∗i and a
2p∗∗
i pay
smaller (and also different) rates to travel with the same level of certainty. At the same
time, the travelers located between a2p∗i and a
2∗∗
i pay a relative high (and different) rate
to travel only when there are 2m available tickets, while those located between a2∗i and
a2p∗i do not bid. When the number of available tickets is 2m, the consequence is again
an extra-profit for the OTA and the airlines on the subset of travelers located between
a2p∗i and a
2∗∗
i and a remainder of unsold tickets corresponding to the potential travelers
between a2∗i and a
2p∗
i .
When the Opaque channel is implemented alone, only the travelers located between
a2∗∗i and a choose to travel at the uniform posted rate a
2∗∗
i .
When Opaque and NYOP systems are implemented jointly, the travelers located be-
tween a2∗∗i and a still choose the Opaque system while the travelers located between a
2p∗
i
and a2∗∗i still choose to bid relatively high (and different) prices to travel only when there
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are 2m available tickets. The Opaque channel is then still dominated by the joint imple-
mentation of the two systems. The relevant comparison is then between the NYOP alone
and the Opaque and NYOP systems applied jointly and particularly, from the OTA’s
point of view, the profits generated by the travelers located between a2∗∗i and a with the
NYOP and with the joint implementation.
If the NYOP channel is implemented alone, the OTA profits are expressed by (6)
piN = 1/2× piN(m) + 1/2× piN(2m) (6)
with
piN(m) = 2
mDH/2∑
k=1
PNHi
[
a2p∗∗i + (k − 1)(a− a2p∗∗i )/[(mDH/2)− 1]
]
+
+2
(m−mDH)/2∑
k=1
PNLi
[
a2∗∗i + (k − 1)(a2p∗∗i − a2∗∗i )/[((m−mDH)/2)− 1]
]
and
piN(2m) = 2×
mDH/2∑
k=1
PNHi
[
a2p∗∗i + (k − 1)(a− a2p∗∗i )/(mDH/2)− 1
]
+2
mDL /2∑
k=1
PNLi
[
a2p∗i + (k − 1)((a2p∗∗i − a2p∗i ))/(mDL /2)− 1
]
where mDH = 2n
(a−a2p∗∗i )
a
and mDL = 2n(
a2p∗∗i −a2p∗i
a
), given the level of uncertainty corre-
sponding to case (1), are the number of tickets obtained by travelers able to bid high
prices in order to acquire one ticket respectively in all states of the world and the number
of tickets obtained by travelers able to bid high prices in order to acquire one ticket if
2m tickets are available.
If the OTA decides to implement jointly both of the channels, its profits are given by
equation (7)
piO/N = (2nm−m2)a(u+ u¯/2)/2n
+
(mDL /2+m
D
H/2−m/2)∑
k=1
PNi
[
a2p∗i + (k − 1)(a2∗∗i − a2p∗i )/((mDL /2 +mDH/2−m/2)− 1)
] (7)
Let’s begin by an illustration of the smallest case where n = 4 and m = 2. Then,
when there are only 2 tickets available, only 1 potential passenger from each subset (or
segment) can travel whereas 2 from each subset can travel when 4 tickets are available.
Given that q < 1, the passengers able to fly when the number of available seats is m = 2
over-evaluate the reservation price a2∗∗i necessary to fly in such conditions and choose
to bid a low rate, while the passengers able to fly only when the available tickets are
2m = 4 overestimate the reservation price a2∗i necessary to fly at a low rate and choose
not to bid. The consequence is that there is only two bidders for the NYOP system,
both bidding lower than a2∗∗i . The receipt profits of the OTA are higher if the Opaque
system is implemented jointly, since in this case the two bidders of the NYOP system
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choose the Opaque system and pay each one a2∗∗i . Due to the minimal dimension of n
and m (the smallest possible), this example is however a limit case where the joint imple-
mentation and the implementation of the Opaque system alone provide the same profit
to the OTA. We provide in Appendix 1 another numerical example with slightly larger
values for m and n where the joint implementation strongly dominates the single imple-
mentation of the two systems taken singularly. We then deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 3. When n, m and q are such that a2∗i < a
2p∗
i < a
2∗∗
i < a
2p∗∗
i , the joint
implementation of the Opaque and the NYOP is always the best solution for the OTA.
Proof : see Appendix 2.
This result indicates that with an average number of potential passengers and a level
of uncertainty rather moderate, is is advantageous for the OTA to propose jointly two
(or more. . . ) Opaque booking systems.
4.4 Large number of tickets
The case 3 is represented in figure (3). It corresponds to large number of available tickets
(quite all of potential travelers can travel when 2m tickets are available). This is not
an unrealistic case. We observe in some periods very low prices on the “last minute” or
even the traditional channel that indicate that few number of potential passengers face a
large supply of seats. The only doubt on the relevance of this case concerns the level of
unpredictability of available tickets number. In low season, low costs companies tend to
offer low prices on the traditional channel without increasing indefinitely the proportion
of Opaque supply: this is probably the best answer to a rather predictable shortage of
demand.
                                     NLP                              
N
HP  
    / 2a  
          
2 *p
ia      
2*
ia                                
2**
ia             
2 **p
ia             
0 
a
Figure 3: Case 3, 2m available tickets.
When the case 3 is relevant, it can be considered as very close to case 1. As in case 1,
when the OTA considers the option of offering the two systems jointly, it evaluates the
trade-off between the high rate passengers (located between a2p∗∗i a), tending to pay more
when the NYOP channel is implemented alone and the number of those (located between
a2∗∗i and a
2p∗∗
i ) who tend to bid at low rate. As in case 1, the potential passengers located
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between a2p∗i and < a
2∗∗
i have the same choices when the NYOP system is implemented
alone or jointly with the Opaque “Hotwire” system. The only difference with case 1 is
that there exist in these two cases an excess demand: indeed one part of low rate bidders
choose to bid a price lower than a2∗i and a more or less large part of them cannot travel,
even when 2m available tickets remain.
Proposition 4. When n, m and q are such that a2p∗i < a
2∗
i < a
2∗∗
i < a
2p∗∗
i , the joint
implementation of the Opaque and the NYOP is always the best solution for the OTA.
Proof : see Appendix 3.
5 Comments and conclusions
After the literature review analyzing the properties of the Opaque booking systems used
by the online travel agencies, this paper considers the possibility of a joint implementation
of two different Opaque systems by the same travel agency. We call the Opaque system,
the one developed by Hotwire.com and the Name-Your-Own-Price system, the one imple-
mented by Priceline.com. We build a 3 stage game model describing the optimal choices
of a travel agency facing a population of potential travelers with differentiated reservation
prices. We first develop the game with imperfect but complete information of potential
passengers (they do not know how many seats will be available but know the reservation
prices of the other passengers). In this case (which is still the only considered by the
literature) the joint implementation of the NYOP and Oapque system has no advantages
over the single implementation of the NYOP system. We then extend the model to the
case of incomplete information (each potential passenger ignore the reservation utility of
the others). We decompose this case in 3 sub-cases and prove that in 2 of them, joint
implementation dominates the other strategies.
An extension of our analysis will consider the welfare issues associated to the incom-
plete information case. Another extension could be to develop the case of duopoly as
an example of competition. Indeed, in the e-tourism markets, a great number of OTAs
compete and co-exist, implementing different distribution strategies. More precisely, two
OTAs compete in the Opaque segment, displaying different selling approaches. We could
at last evaluate the possibility of threshold price variability according to the number of
tickets available and consumer’s arrivals on the market. In fact, it is difficult to pre-
tend that Priceline fixes the threshold price only once at the beginning of the selling
period and maintains it unchanged until the date of departure, despite the evolution
of number of potential travelers and amount of tickets available. This is a formal limit
of our model (and more generally the current limit of models analyzing Opaque channels).
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Appendix
Appendix 1: illustration of small size of Proposition 3
We present an example of small size in which the joint implementation of the Opaque and NYOP systems
strongly dominates the single implementation of the NYOP or the Opaque system. We choose the case
where n = 9 and m = 4. In this case, each subset of n agents is located on the segment [0, a].
In case of complete information, travelers 8 and 9 are able to fly in all states of the world and
travelers 6 and 7 only when there are 8 available tickets (remind that there are 2n travelers located on
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two segments). We normalize a = 1 and determine the threshold values a2∗i = 11/18 and a
2∗∗
i = 15/18
corresponding respectively to the reservation prices of travelers 6 and 8. We choose q = 35/36 which
corresponds to a very moderate level of uncertainty (with q = 1, the potential travelers have a complete
information on the reservation price of the NYOP bidders). Since in this case a2p∗∗i is between a
2∗∗
i and
a, when the NYOP system is implemented alone, only the traveler 9 chooses to bid at a high price (what
makes his flight certain), while travelers 7 and 8 choose to bid at a low price (with the probability p = 1/2
to travel) and agent 6 do not bid. When there are m = 4 available tickets, only agents 8 and 9 travel and
at very (in this case) different rates. Given the values on the parameters, we obtain a2p∗∗i = a
2p∗∗
9 what
can be deduced from the general formula a2p∗∗i = (aq−2aiq+2ai)(2n−m−1)/2n which substitutes when
m and n are small to the approximation a2p∗∗i = (aq−2aiq+2ai)(2n−m)/2n. One obtains a2p∗∗9 = 0.859
while a2p∗8 = 0.613. Their sum 1.472 is the OTA profits obtained by distributing to high rate population
when the NYOP system is implemented alone. When the Opaque system is jointly implemented, agents
8 and 9 choose this Opaque system and pay each one the reservation price a2∗∗8 = 0.833 of agent 8. The
resulting profits are then i.e. 1.666 for the OTA. Then we compare these profits with those obtained
if the NYOP system is implemented alone 1.472. Since agent 7 still bid the same amount a2p∗6 with or
without the Opaque system’s implementation and agent 6 still do not bid, the joint implementation of
the two systems then provides higher profits to the OTA 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
Given that potential travelers located between a2∗i and a
2∗∗
i choose the same action when the NYOP
is implemented alone or jointly with the Opaque system, we consider only the optimal actions of the
potential travelers located between a2∗∗i and a. According to the relative values of n, m and q, every
agent j belonging to this subset chooses to bid at price PNHj or P
N
Lj according to his own position related
to a2p∗∗i . If the agent is located between a
2∗∗
i and a
2p∗∗
i , he chooses to bid low price P
N
Lj . If he is
located between a2p∗∗i and a, he bids high price P
N
Hj . When the two systems are jointly implemented, all
the potential travelers located between a2∗∗i and a pay P
O. Equations (6) and (7) can be respectively
expressed as (8) and (9) with:
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Figure 4: Comparison between NYOP and joint implementation in case 1
piN = 1/(8n2(n+m(−1 + q)− 2nq)2)a(n3(m(−2 + q)− 2n(−1 + q))q
+2(m− n)2(−1 + q)(m+ n(−2 + q)−mq)(n+m(−1 + q)− 2nq))
+n3q((m− 2n)(m(−2 + q)− 2n(−1 + q))
+(2m(m− n)nq(n+m(−1 + q)− 2nq))/(n+ 2m(−1 + q)− 2nq)2))(2u+ u¯)
(8)
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and
piO/N = 1/4a(m(2−m/n)− ((m− n)(mn(5− 4q) + 2m2(−1 + q) + 2n2(−1 + q))q)
/(n+ 2m(−1 + q)− 2nq)2)(2u+ u¯) (9)
The conditions on parameters a, u, u¯, 1/2 < q < 1 and the condition m ≤ n/2 are sufficient to make in
all cases piN smaller than piO/N (see Figure 4) 
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
In the case 3, if the NYOP channel is implemented alone, the OTA profits are expressed by (10):
piN = 1/2pi(m) + 1/2pi(2m) (10)
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Figure 5: Comparison between NYOP and joint implementation in case 3
with
piN (m) = 2
mDH/2∑
k=1
PNHi
[
a2p∗∗i + (k − 1)(a− a2p∗∗i )/(mDH/2− 1)
]
+2
(m−mDH)/2∑
k=1
PNLi
[
a2∗∗i + (k − 1)(a2p∗∗i − a2∗∗i )/((m−mDH)/2− 1)
]
and
piN (2m) = 2
mDH/2∑
k=1
PNHi(a
2p∗∗
i + (k − 1)(ai − a2p∗∗i )/(mDH/2− 1))
+2
m−mDH/2∑
k=1
PNLi(a
2∗
i + (k − 1)(a2p∗∗i − a2∗i )/(m−mDH/2− 1))
When the two systems are jointly implemented, the OTA profits are given by (11):
piO/N = (2nm−m2)a(u+ u¯/2)/2n+
m/2∑
k=1
PNi
[
a2∗i +
(k − 1)(a2∗∗i − a2∗i )
(m/2− 1)
]
(11)
Equations (10) and (11) can be respectively expressed as (12) and (13) with:
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piN = (−1/(4n2(n+m(−1 + q)− 2nq)2)a
(5m5(−1 + q)3 − 8n5(−1 + q)3 −m4n(−1 + q)2(−27 + 31q)
+m3n2(−1 + q)(59 + q(−133 + 72q)) +m2n3(65 + q(−215 + 230q − 78q2))
+mn4(−36 + q(117 + 4q(−31 + 10q))))(2u+ u¯))
(12)
and
piO/N = −(am(mn(5− 3q) + n2(−4 + q) + 2m2(−1 + q))(2u+ u¯))/(4n2) (13)
The conditions on parameters a, u, u¯, 1/2 < q < 1 and the condition m ≥ n/2 are sufficient to make in
all cases piN smaller than piO/N (see Figure 5) 
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